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随着我国分税制财政体制的不断发展和地方财政自主权的不断扩大,地方税收竞争对经济增长效应问题也逐渐成为一个客观存在且不可回避的财政问题。本文基于中国省级地方政府的经验数据,运用门槛面板模型对我国地方税收竞争的经济增长效应进行实证分析发现:一是我国地方政府显著存在税收竞争行为,且并未出现恶性"逐底竞争",地方税收竞争促进了我国地区经济增长;二是我国地方税收竞争对地方经济增长影响存在门槛效应,对不同经济发展水平地区的经济增长促进效应存在差异,经济越发达地区促进作用越明显;三是我国地方税收竞争除税率形式的竞争外,集聚租形式也有极其重要的地位。针对实证分析本文又进一步提出了完善分税制财政体制建设,完善财政转移支付制度、推进地方基本公共服务均等化建设,协调区域发展,改革建设多层次税收优惠体制等政策建议。
Abstract：With the continuous development of the fiscal system and the continuous expansion of the local financial autonomy in China, effect of local tax competition on economic growth becomes an objective and unavoidable financial problem that our government needs to face. The paper makes an empirical study on the effect of local tax competition on economic growth based on the Chinese provincial governments' data by panel threshold model. We have reached some conclusions: First, there is a significant local tax competition behavior between provincial governments which promotes the economic growth of our country. There is no appearance of "race to the bottom" in China. Second, local tax competition has a threshold effect on economic growth. Local tax competition has a more obvious positive effect on developed areas than developing areas. Third, competitions on tax rate and agglomeration rent are both universal in Chinese local tax competition. We put forward constructive suggestions on the problem of local tax competition in China according to main conclusions of this paper. First, we should make a more scientific balance between central and local financial authority and powers. Second, we should promote transfer payment system and equalization of basic public service to balance economic growth between different regions. Last, we should form a multi-level tax preferential system to guarantee the fairness of local tax competition.
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基本信息:
DOI：
中图分类号:F812.42
引用信息:
[1]路春城,武嘉盟.地方税收竞争促进了经济增长吗?——基于中国省级政府面板数据的门槛回归分析[J].公共财政研究,2019,No.25(01):17-35.
基金信息:
国家社科基金一般项目“税收促进我国制造业技术创新的激励机制、政策效应和路径选择研究”(18BJL068)阶段性研究成果